Indirect horizontal application of the right to have access to health care services by Pieterse, Marius
INDIRECT HORIZONTAL
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Apart from their direct application against the state, the justiciability of socio-
economic rights also requires the transformation of those aspects of private law that
regulate relationships which are crucial for their effective enjoyment. This is
acknowledged by the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, which
determines that rights may sometimes bind private parties and requires courts to
develop the common law in accordance with the spirit, purport and objects of the
rights in the Bill of Rights. Common-law development is a viable remedial paradigm
for the horizontal enforcement of socio-economic rights. This is particularly because
the value-based development of common law in the course of private-law litigation is
often regarded as an uncontroversial aspect of the judicial function, even in legal
cultures to which the notion of rights-based judicial review is novel or alien. To
illustrate the necessity of infusing the private law realm with public law values
associated with the protection of socio-economic rights, the article considers the effect
of the constitutional right of access to health care services, on the body of South
African private law pertaining to the regulation of the doctor-patient relationship.
After making a case for the seepage of public law norms into the private-law
regulation of this relationship, the article points to certain features of such regulation
that appear in need of reconceptualisation in light of relevant constitutional
guarantees. It then suggests certain modifications to the existing legal position and
critically discusses case law in which similar developments have been contemplated.
I INTRODUCTION
Conventional, liberal human rights discourse has often assumed that
rights are not fit for application against non-state actors. Much has
been made of the ‘public law’ character of rights, which were initially
designed to curb excesses of public power, rather than to regulate
‘private’ commercial or interpersonal relationships. Over time, how-
ever, the distinction between the public and private spheres as
respectively being appropriate and inappropriate venues for the
application of human rights norms has been unmasked as artificial,
counterproductive and oppressive, especially in a lived reality where
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much harm is suffered by vulnerable members of society at the hands of
powerful private entities.1
Along similar lines, conventional liberal human rights discourse’s
opposition to the notion of justiciable socio-economic rights has, in
recent years, been significantly deflated. Arguments that socio-economic
rights are conceptually ill-suited for judicial review and that courts are
politically poorly positioned and institutionally ill-equipped to decide
matters of social and economic justice are increasingly regarded as
overstated,2 while the lived reality of poverty and material deprivation
refutes the notion that respect for and affirmation of inherent human
dignity is achievable through the protection of civil liberties alone.3
But, notwithstanding increasing acceptance that, first, judicial enforce-
ment of socio-economic rights is both possible and necessary and that,
secondly, human rights should sometimes infiltrate the private sphere,
suggestions that socio-economic rights should be capable of ‘private’
enforcement are typically met with skepticism or outright dismissal. In
addition to ideological and political objections to the idea that private
parties should sometimes be bound to socio-economic rights, it is often
argued that such ‘horizontal application’ of socio-economic rights would
impose overly onerous duties on private parties. Given further that the
recognition and enforcement of socio-economic rights is typically
associated with a particular, social-democratic, view of the state, it is
readily assumed that they should bind only the state.4
On the other hand, there is nothing inherent in socio-economic rights
that render them incapable of horizontal application. This is clearly
illustrated by the everyday enforcement of a great many socio-economic
1 On the ‘traditional’ assumptions against the application of public law norms in the private
sphere and their flaws, see, for instance, H Cheadle ‘Application’ in MH Cheadle et al (eds)
South African Constitutional Law: The Bill of Rights (2002) 19, 22; H Cheadle & D Davis ‘The
Application of the 1996 Constitution in the Private Sphere’ (1997) 13 SAJHR 44, 45-51; DM
Chirwa ‘The Horizontal Application of Constitutional Rights in a Comparative Perspective’
(2006) 10 Law, Democracy & Development 21-48; A Cockrell ‘Private Law and the Bill of
Rights: A Threshold Issue of ‘‘Horizontality’’’ in Butterworths Bill of Rights Compendium
(RS13 Oct 2003) ch3A at 3-5; J van der Walt ‘Blixen’s Difference: Horizontal Application of
Fundamental Rights and the Resistance to Neo-colonialism’ (2003) TSAR 311-31; S Woolman
& D Davis ‘The Last Laugh: Du Plessis v De Klerk, Classical Liberalism, Creole Liberalism and
the Application of Fundamental Rights under the Interim and the Final Constitutions’ (1996)
12 SAJHR 361, 399-401.
2 See discussion in M Pieterse ‘Coming to Terms with Judicial Enforcement of Socio-economic
Rights’ (2004) 20 SAJHR 383, 389-99, and authorities cited there.
3 See N Haysom ‘Constitutionalism, Majoritarian Democracy and Socio-economic Rights’
(1992) 8 SAJHR 451, 452; S Liebenberg ‘The Value of Human Dignity in Interpreting Socio-
economic Rights’ (2005) 21 SAJHR 1, 2-3; 7; E Mureinik ‘Beyond a Charter of Luxuries:
Economic Rights in the Constitution’ (1992) 8 SAJHR 464, 465; C Scott ‘The Interdependence
and Permeability of Human Rights Norms: Towards a Partial Fusion of the International
Covenants on Human Rights’ (1989) 27 Osgoode Hall LJ 769, 789-90; 798-99; R West ‘Rights,
Capabilities and the Good Society’ (2001) 69 Fordham LR 1901, 1902.
4 See Cheadle & Davis (note 1 above) 59-60; Cockrell (note 1 above) 13; R Ku¨nnemann ‘A
Coherent Approach to Human Rights’ (1995) 17 Human Rights Q 323, 339-40.
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rights and duties contained in legislation and common law.5 Moreover,
there is growing consensus that private entities are every bit as capable of
harming the enjoyment of socio-economic rights as the state. Apart from
the socio-economic significance of individual actions and interactions,
corporations (which typically command substantial power and resources)
are increasingly implicated in socio-economic rights violations.6 The
transfer of State power to the private sector through privatization policies
has intensified this phenomenon, not only by increasing the social
significance of corporate action, but also by transferring many ‘welfare-
related’ functions, once associated exclusively with the state, to the
private sector.
The increasing capacity of private entities to determine access to socio-
economic amenities clearly suggests that the transfer of state-like powers
and functions to the private sector should be accompanied by a similar
transfer of socio-economic responsibility and accountability.7 But, even
beyond the corporatisation of welfare functions, it would be incongruous
to preclude socio-economic rights from applying in any so-called ‘private’
interactions, since this would remove the protection awarded by the
rights from the very context where the consequences of socio-economic
rights violations are most often felt.8
This article aims to contribute to the formulation of a coherent and
workable theory on the horizontal application of socio-economic rights,
5 KD Ewing ‘Social Rights and Constitutional Law’ (1999) Public Law 104, 119; DL Pearmain
‘Contracting for Socio-economic Rights: A Contradiction in Terms?’ (2006) 69 THRHR 287,
289.
6 See M Heywood ‘Debunking ‘‘Conglomo-talk’’: A Case Study of the Amicus Curiae as an
Instrument for Advocacy, Investigation and Mobilisation’ (2001) 5 Law, Democracy &
Development 133, 134-35; S Liebenberg ‘Violations of Socio-economic Rights: The Role of the
South African Human Rights Commission’ in P Andrews & S Ellmann (eds) The Post-
Apartheid Constitutions: Perspectives on South Africa’s Basic Law (2001) 405, 414; SR Ratner
‘Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility’ (2001) 111 Yale LJ 443,
462; JJ Paust ‘Human Rights Responsibilities of Private Corporations’ (2002) 35 Vanderbilt J of
Transnational Law 801, 802.
7 MCR Craven The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A
Perspective on its Development (1995) 122; I Currie & J De Waal The New Constitutional and
Administrative Law Volume 1: Constitutional Law (2001) 93-4; DM Chirwa ‘Non-state Actors’
Responsibility for Socio-economic rights: The Nature of their Obligations under the South
African Constitution’ (2002) 3(3) ESR Rev 2, 6; DM Chirwa ‘The Right to Health in
International Law: Its Implications for the Obligations of State and Non-state Actors in
Ensuring Access to Essential Medicine’ (2003) 19 SAJHR 541, 559; 561-62; S Gutto ‘Modern
‘‘Globalisation’’ and the Challenges to Social, Economic, and Cultural Rights for Human rights
Practitioners and Activists in Africa’ (Oct-Dec 2000) Africa Legal Aid 2; M Pieterse ‘Beyond the
Welfare State: Globalization of Neo-liberal Culture and the Constitutional Protection of Social
and Economic Rights in South Africa’ (2003) 14 Stell LR 3, 25-6.
8 J Van der Walt ‘Progressive Indirect Horizontal Application of the Bill of Rights: Towards a
Co-operative Relation between Common-law and Constitutional Jurisprudence’ (2001) 17
SAJHR 341, 353. See further Guideline 18 of the Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1998); S Leckie ‘Another Step Towards Indivisibility:
Identifying the Key Features of Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1998) 20
Human Rights Q 81, 108; 111.
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by investigating the indirect impact of justiciable socio-economic rights
on those aspects of private law that regulate private (personal,
contractual or commercial) relationships which are crucial for the
effective enjoyment of socio-economic rights. I argue that the judicial
development of the common law (of which the bulk of South African
private law consists) in resonance with the values underlying justiciable
socio-economic rights presents a viable remedial paradigm for the
actualisation of socio-economic rights in the private sphere. This is
particularly so, I contend, because the value-based development of
common-law norms in the course of private-law litigation is typically
regarded as an uncontroversial aspect of the judicial function, even in
legal cultures to which the notion of rights-based judicial review is novel
or alien.
The focus of the article is largely confined to the impact of the right of
everyone to have access to health care services, guaranteed by s 27(1)(a)
of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (‘the
Constitution’) on the body of South African private law pertaining to
the regulation of the doctor-patient relationship. In section II below, I
first discuss the manner and extent to which socio-economic rights are
generally capable of applying to ‘private’ matters, in terms of the
provisions governing rights-adjudication under the South African Bill of
Rights. I then engage with the content of the right to have access to
health care services, in an attempt to ascertain the extent to which the
obligations generated by the right are fit for horizontal application.
Thereafter, section III discusses the potential of common-law develop-
ment as remedial paradigm for giving effect to certain of the horizontal
dimensions of the right. After making a case for the seepage of public law
norms into the private-law regulation of the doctor-patient relationship, I
point to features of such regulation that appear in need of reconceptua-
lization, in light of the constitutional guarantee of access to medical care.
I suggest modifications to the existing state of common law in this regard
and critically discuss case law in which similar modifications have been
contemplated.
Overall, the article intends to illustrate that judicial engagement with
justiciable socio-economic rights must extend beyond the ‘traditional’
public-law understanding of rights-based judicial review. Justiciable
socio-economic rights ultimately require the reconstruction of the tenets
of both the public and private law spheres, whilst highlighting anew the
artificiality of their separation.
II THE HORIZONTAL APPLICATION OF THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO HEALTH
CARE SERVICES IN SOUTH AFRICA
(a) Socio-economic rights and horizontal application
According to s 7(2) of the Constitution, the State must ‘respect, protect,
promote and fulfill the rights in the Bill of Rights’. The obligation to
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‘protect’ the rights in the Bill of Rights is typically understood to mean
that the state must safeguard individual members of society from
infringements of their rights by third parties and must ensure the
adequacy of legal remedies that prevent or compensate for such
infringements. In relation to socio-economic rights, this appears to imply
the recognition, regulation and enforcement of so-called ‘private’ or
‘horizontal’ socio-economic obligations.9
Horizontal application of the rights in the South African Bill of Rights
is regulated primarily by subsecs 8(2)-(3) of the Constitution, which
determine:
(2) A provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or juristic person if, and to the extent
that, it is applicable, taking into account the nature of the right and the nature of any
duty imposed by the right.
(3) When applying a provision of the Bill of Rights to a natural or juristic person in
terms of subsection (2), a court —
(a) in order to give effect to a right in the Bill, must apply, or if necessary develop, the
common law to the extent that legislation does not give effect to that rights; and
(b) may develop rules of the common law to limit the right, provided that the limitation
is in accordance with section 36(1).
While nowhere excluding socio-economic rights from horizontal applica-
tion, these provisions acknowledge that not every right, and not all
obligations imposed by a particular right, are capable of horizontal
application. A further factor that is clearly relevant to a judicial decision
on whether to allow for the horizontal application of a particular socio-
economic right, is the nature or identity of the person or entity against
whom the right is to be applied, for the obvious reason that everyone
does not have equal capacity to comply with the various obligations
imposed by all socio-economic rights.10 Alfred Cockrell’s assertion that
that s 8(2) ‘proceeds on the assumption that constitutional rights might
be agent-relative and context-sensitive, inasmuch as their direct applica-
tion against private agencies will depend on the circumstances of the case
and the characteristics of the particular person’11 is therefore particularly
significant for the horizontal application of socio-economic rights.
9 In relation to the obligation to protect under international law and s 7(2), see, for example,
Chirwa (SAJHR) (note 7 above) 559-60; P De Vos ‘Pious Wishes or Directly Enforceable
Human Rights?: Social and Economic Rights in South Africa’s 1996 Constitution’ (1997) 13
SAJHR 67, 83; S Ellmann ‘A Constitutional Confluence: American ‘‘State-action’’ Law and the
Application of South Africa’s Socio-economic Rights Guarantees to Private Actors’ in
Andrews & Ellmann (eds) (note 6 above) 444, 448; Leckie (note 8 above) 109; Liebenberg (note
6 above) 414; S Liebenberg ‘South Africa’s Evolving Jurisprudence on Socio-economic rights:
An Effective Tool in Challenging Poverty?’ (2002) 6 Law, Democracy & Development 159, 163-
64; C Scott & P Macklem ‘Constitutional Ropes of Sand or Justiciable Guarantees? Social
Rights in a New South African Constitution’ (1992) 141 Univ of Pennsylvania LR 1, 74.
10 See Ellmann (note 9 above) 444; 446; 462-67; also Chirwa (ESR) (note 7 above) 4; 6; JW
Nickel ‘How Human Rights Generate Duties to Protect and Provide’ (1993) 15 Human Rights
Quarterly 76, 78; 81-2; Ratner (note 6 above) 497-511; 524-25; H Shue ‘The Interdependence of
Duties’ in P Alston & K Tomasevski (eds) The Right to Food (1984) 83, 90.
11 Cockrell (note 1 above) 13.
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Stephen Ellman argues that the extent to which a private entity may be
held accountable for infringements of socio-economic rights must depend
on the nature and extent of the power exercised by the entity, the degree
to which the power emulates state powers and the impact of the power on
the enjoyment of socio-economic rights. Ellmann accordingly suggests
that entities which exercise powers or perform functions that emulate
those of the state, or that impact on the exercise of rights by citizens in a
similar manner, should be held bound by relevant socio-economic
provisions in the Bill of Rights.12 A further factor to take into account is
the relationship between the person or group seeking to enforce their
socio-economic rights and the entity against whom horizontal application
is sought. It may be argued that private entities should only be regarded
as bound by socio-economic obligations where a ‘special relationship’
exists between them and the relevant rights-bearer(s).13
Section 8(3) of the Constitution proceeds to indicate that rights would
seldom directly apply to a ‘private’ dispute. The preferred manner to
vindicate them in the private sphere would be by way of legislative
enactment or through developing and/or limiting the rules of the
common law, which would conceivably generate more effective remedies
for private rights-infringements.14 Further relevant in this respect is
s 39(2) of the Constitution, which determines:
(2) When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or
customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and
objects of the Bill of Rights.
It appears that South African courts are constitutionally mandated to
develop the common law in situations where this is necessary for the
effective enjoyment of socio-economic rights, regardless of the manner in
which the rights are applied in a given case. Given the plethora of
relevant legislative provisions regulating social service delivery and the
vast body of common law that may be developed to give effect to socio-
economic rights, direct reliance on socio-economic rights in private
disputes will thus likely be a rare occurrence. It may therefore be expected
12 Ellmann (note 9 above) 444; 446; 462-67. According to Ellmann, factors considered by US
Courts in ‘state action cases’ (such as the degree to which the power derived from or was
granted, compelled or encouraged by the state; the degree to which the state facilitates or
regulates the exercise of the power; the degree of co-operation between the entity and the state
and whether a particular private power or function is usually exercised by the state) are helpful
in exploring the ‘public’ nature of privately exercised powers or functions. See further Chirwa
(ESR) (note 7 above) 6; Chirwa (note 1 above) 22-6; Ratner (note 6 above) 497-506; 524-25.
13 See Ratner (ibid) 506-11; 525; Shue (note 10 above) 90.
14 See J De Waal; I Currie & G Erasmus The Bill of Rights Handbook 4ed (2001) 37; S Liebenberg
‘Socio-economic Rights’ in M Chaskalson et al (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa (RS5,
1999) ch 41 at 46; Pearmain (note 5 above) 289-90 and also the separate concurring remarks of
Sachs J in Du Plessis v De Klerk 1996 (3) SA 850 (CC) para 187.
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that the horizontal dimensions of socio-economic rights will for the
foreseeable future be limited, either to the vindication of statutory socio-
economic obligations against private entities, or to the development of
relevant common-law rules or doctrines that regulate private relation-
ships.
(b) Horizontal dimensions of the right to have access to health care
services
Section 27 of the Constitution determines, in relevant part:
(1) Everyone has the right to have access to-
(a) health care services, including reproductive health care; . . .
(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available
resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of . . . [this] right]. . ..
The most convincing argument against the horizontal application of
socio-economic rights in the Constitution relates to the wording of subsec
27(2), which requires the state (and, by implication, only the state) to take
reasonable measures in order to achieve the progressive realisation of the
right of access to health care services. This appears to indicate that the
obligations engendered by s 27 are too onerous to bind also individuals or
other private entities.15 However, such a view of s 27 is overly simplistic.
While the obligation to progressively achieve universal access to health
care services by way of reasonable measures indeed attaches only to the
state, this is but one of the myriad of (positive and negative) obligations
generated by s 27(1). Subject to the (express and implied) limitations on
horizontal application derived from s 8 of the Constitution, all
obligations inherent in s 27(1)(a) except for that set out in s 27(2) should
in principle be viewed as capable of attaching to private entities.16
However, the South African Constitutional Court’s approach to the
interpretation of s 27 has thus far not shed much light on the content of
these obligations, nor on the extent to which they may be regarded as
horizontally enforceable. In Grootboom, an access to housing case, the
Court developed a so-called ‘reasonableness approach’ to the adjudica-
tion of socio-economic rights, which focuses on the obligation in ss 26(2)
15 Noted by P Carstens & A Kok ‘An Assessment of the Use of Disclaimers by South African
Hospitals in View of Constitutional Demands, Foreign Law and Medico-legal Considerations’
(2003) 18 SA Public Law 430, 437; 440; De Waal; Currie & Erasmus (note 14 above) 55; 57;
Ellmann (note 9 above) 445; 460; Pearmain (note 5 above) 293 and, in a different context,
Ewing (note 5 above) 120.
16 See Ellmann (note 9 above) 461; Liebenberg (note 14 above) 45; F Michelman ‘The
Constitution, Social Rights and Reason: A Tribute to Etienne Mureinik’ (1998) 14 SAJHR
499, 504; JC Mubangizi ‘Public Health, the South African Bill of Rights and the Socio-
economic polemic’ (2002) TSAR 343, 345; Pieterse (note 7 above) 26.
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and 27(2) of the Constitution that measures adopted in pursuit of the
progressive realisation of socio-economic rights must be reasonable.17
The approach was also followed in relation to the right of access to health
care services in Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign. In this
case, the Constitutional Court dismissed arguments advanced by the
amici curiae that s 27(1)(a) of the Constitution engendered a minimum
core obligation to immediately provide essential medicines to those who
are unable to access them for themselves and appeared unwilling to
award any individually enforceable content to s 27(1)(a), separate from
the overarching obligation contained in s 27(2).18 This approach sparked
much criticism for implying that the socio-economic rights in the
Constitution amount merely to an amorphous, administrative law-like,
state obligation to act reasonably when devising social policy.19
While the Treatment Action Campaign Court’s remarks apply mostly to
the question of minimum core obligations and do not in any way touch
on the horizontal application of s 27(1)(a), its reluctance to read this
subsection separately from s 27(2) significantly frustrates efforts to
develop a coherent theory on the horizontal application of the right, since
it complicates the process of distinguishing obligations capable of
horizontal application from the state-restricted obligation elaborated in
s 27(2).20
Thus far, the only allusion to the horizontal dimensions of s 27 in the
jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court is to be found in a separate
concurring judgment in Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu
Natal, where Madala J remarked in passing on the important role played
by the private health care sector in rendering complex medical treatment
beyond the resource capacity of the state. The judge viewed allegations
that the appellant was not informed of his options to access private sector
17 See Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) paras 39-44;
46. According to the Court, the obligation of reasonableness entails that socio-economic
measures aimed at the progressive realisation of the right must be comprehensive, coherent,
balanced and flexible, must clearly set out the responsibilities of different spheres of
government and must ensure that appropriate resources are available for their implementa-
tion. Measures must further be inclusive and must cater for the satisfaction of urgent and
emergency needs of vulnerable sectors of society.
18 Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (No 2) 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) paras 29-39.
19 See, for example, D Bilchitz ‘Towards a Reasonable Approach to the Minimum Core: Laying
the Foundations for Future Socio-economic Rights Jurisprudence’ (2003) 19 SAJHR 1, 8-10;
D Brand ‘The Proceduralisation of South African Socio-economic Rights Jurisprudence, or
‘‘What are Socio-economic Rights For?’’ ’ in H Botha et al (eds) Rights and Democracy in a
Transformative Constitution (2003) 33, 36-7; 39; 49; 55; C Chetty ‘The Right to Health Care
Services: Interpreting Section 27 of the Constitution’ (2002) 17 SA Public Law 453, 455; 461; F
Coomans ‘Reviewing Implementation of Social and Economic Rights: An Assessment of the
Reasonableness Test as Developed by the South African Constitutional Court’ (2005) 65
Heidelberg J of Int L 167, 188; I Currie ‘Bill of Rights Jurisprudence’ (2002) Annual Survey of
SA Law 36, 72; Liebenberg (note 9 above) 176; T Roux ‘Understanding Grootboom — A
Response to Cass R Sunstein’ (2002) 12(2) Constitutional Forum 41, 46.
20 See Chetty (note 19 above) 455; Chirwa (ESR) (note 7 above) 5.
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care as ‘a serious indictment for the private sector’ and concluded that
‘the private sector is not before us and we cannot condemn it without
hearing it’.21 This seemed to imply that Madala J would not have
difficulty in holding the private health sector accountable under s 27(1) if
it were before the Court in an appropriate matter.
Looking towards non-judicial interpretations of the right of access to
health care services, it appears that at least three kinds of obligations
inherent to the right are capable of horizontal application. First,
commentators generally agree that the negative obligation to respect
socio-economic rights under s 7(2) of the Constitution must operate
horizontally, if private parties are to have any remedy against unlawful
private interferences with the exercise of their rights. In relation to
s 27(1)(a), this implies an enforceable obligation on private entities to
refrain from disrupting, denying, impairing or obstructing existing access
to health care services without constitutionally acceptable justification.22
Secondly, there appears to be consensus that the equality threshold
underlying the determination in s 27(1)(a) that ‘everyone’ is entitled to
have access to health care services,23 is horizontally enforceable in
conjunction with the prohibition on unfair discrimination by private
entities under s 9(4) of the Constitution.24 This means that citizens should
be able to demand access to medical treatment from private sources
21 Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu Natal 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC) para 48. Chaskalson
P, writing for the majority, seemed to distance himself from these remarks by declining
explicitly to remark on the private sector’s attitude in this regard. Ibid para 35.
22 See, in relation to the obligation to respect the right to health in international law, Nickel (note
10 above) 78; 82; Paust (note 6 above) 819; Shue (note 10 above) 88-9; and in relation to the
horizontal operation of the duty under the South African Constitution Chirwa (ESR) (note 7
above) 5-6; Chirwa (SAJHR) (note 7 above) 559; 564; De Vos (note 9 above) 100; Ellmann
(note 9 above) 460-61; Liebenberg (note 6 above) 415; Liebenberg (note 9 above) 178; Pieterse
(note 7 above) 26.
23 The ‘everyone’ threshold to s 27(1)(a) is understood to forbid, first, any group-based
distinctions in health care service provision, secondly, the arbitrary or unfair exclusion of any
individual from the ambit of policies, laws and programmes which confer health-related
benefits and, thirdly, the inequitable provision of health care services. See P De Vos
‘Grootboom, the Right of Access to Housing and Substantive Equality as Contextual Fairness’
(2001) 17 SAJHR 258, 265-66; Liebenberg (note 14 above) 26-7; C Ngwena ‘Access to Health
Care as a Fundamental Right: The Scope and Limits of Section 27 of the Constitution’ (2000)
25(1) J for Juridical Science 1, 3; 7-9; 27; C Ngwena ‘Aids in Africa: Access to Health Care as a
Human Right’ (2000) 15 SA Public Law 1, 13; M Pieterse ‘Foreigners and Socio-economic
Rights: Legal Entitlements or Wishful Thinking?’ (2000) 63 THRHR 51, 54; 56; South African
Human Rights Commission Third Economic and Social Rights Report (1999) 189.
24 See Chirwa (ESR) (note 7 above) 4; Chirwa (SAJHR) (note 7 above) 559; 564-65. Section 9(4)
determines that ‘no person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on
one or more grounds [including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social
origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language
and birth]’ and mandates the enactment of national legislation preventing or prohibiting unfair
discrimination in the private sphere.
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where such treatment is being withheld arbitrarily or due to unfair
discrimination.25
Thirdly, horizontally enforceable obligations may well lurk in the
requirement that access to health care services must be meaningful. This
requirement is not explicit from the wording of s 27(1)(a) but is arguably
inherent in the notion of ‘access’ to health care services.26 In its 14th
General Comment, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights determined that health care services must be physically
accessible, available, affordable, culturally acceptable as well as
‘medically appropriate and of good quality’ for the meaningful
enjoyment of the right to the highest attainable standard of health.27
There are some indications in South African socio-economic rights
jurisprudence that the notion of ‘access’ in s 27(1)(a) may be understood
to imply similar qualitative standards.28 Such an understanding of
‘access’ may entail an obligation for certain private entities to ensure that
the acceptability, accessibility, availability and quality of health care
25 Examples of instances where private entities may be regarded as being in violation of this
equality threshold are to be found in the illustrative list of unfair practices in the health sector
contained in item 3 of the Schedule to the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair
Discrimination Act 4 of 2000. The list declares the following practices to be unfair: ‘(a)
Subjecting persons to medical experiments without their informed consent. (b) Unfairly
denying or refusing any person access to health care facilities or failing to make health care
facilities accessible to any person. (c) Refusing to provide emergency medical treatment to
persons of particular groups identified by one or more of the prohibited grounds. (d) Refusing
to provide reasonable health services to the elderly’. The list is further augmented by
provisions declaring that it amounts to unfair discrimination on the basis of race to provide
inferior services to any racial group (s 7(d)) and that it amounts to unfair discrimination on the
ground of gender to limit women’s access to social benefits such as health benefits (s 8(g)).
26 For arguments that ‘access’ to care must satisfy certain qualitative standards in order to be
meaningful, see A Abbe ‘‘‘Meaningful Access’’ to Health Care and the Remedies Available to
Medicaid Managed Care Recipients under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act’ (1999) 147
Univ Pennsylvania LR 1161-203; M Geldenhuys ‘The Rights to Health Care and Housing:
Some Aspects of Constitutional Interpretation’ (2005) 17 SA Merc LJ 182, 193; D Giesen
‘Health Care as a Right: Some Practical Implications’ (1994) 13Medicine & Law 285, 290; AC
Hendriks ‘Patients’ Rights and Access to Health Care’ (2001) 20 Medicine & Law 371, 374; D
Orentlicher ‘Destructuring Disability: Rationing of Health Care and Unfair Discrimination
against the Sick’ (1996) 31 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties LR 49, 79-82; M Pieterse
‘Resuscitating Socio-economic Rights: Constitutional Entitlements to Health Care Services’
(2006) 22 SAJHR 473, 495-96; KE Tranoy ‘Vital Needs, Human Rights, Health Care Law’
(1996) 15 Medicine & Law 183, 186-88.
27 UNCESCR General Comment 14 ‘The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health
(article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights)’ (2000)
para 12.
28 In relation to housing, there are indications that the Constitutional Court understands the
notion of access as imposing substantive standards. See Grootboom (note 17 above) paras 35-6.
In Pharmaceutical Society of South Africa v Tshabalala-Msimang 2005 (3) SA 238 (SCA) paras
42; 53; 77 the SCA held that ‘access’ to health care services required services to be both
physically accessible and affordable, and was of the opinion that prohibitive pricing of
medicines may infringe this standard. This view attracted support in the separate concurring
judgment by Moseneke J in the case’s subsequent appeal to the Constitutional Court. See
Minister of Health v New Clicks SA (Pty) Ltd 2006 (2) SA 311 (CC) para 706.
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services is maintained or, at least, not interfered with.29 In particular,
private health care facilities or practitioners may be regarded as
constitutionally obliged to render health care services of appropriate
quality.30
There has thus far been one prominent attempt at enforcing such an
obligation. In Strydom v Afrox Healthcare, the Pretoria High Court
declared a contractual clause, that insulated a health care facility from
delictual liability arising from the negligent conduct of its personnel, to be
contra bonos mores and unenforceable. The Court regarded s 27(1)(a) as
indirectly applicable to private hospitals and held that the right of access
to health care services awarded patients a legitimate expectation that the
services to which they have access would be rendered with skill and care
by professional and trained health care personnel.31 This amounts to the
most definite affirmation of the horizontal dimensions and implicit
quality standards inherent in s 27(1)(a) in South African jurisprudence to
date, and is welcomed accordingly.32 Whereas the SCA overturned this
judgment on appeal (since it felt that the exclusion clause did not deny
access to treatment and did not explicitly allow for negligent or
substandard care), it assumed in favour of the applicant that the right
could be horizontally applied and left open the question of whether s
27(1)(a) presupposed a minimum level of care.33
It would therefore appear that, notwithstanding the wording of s 27(2)
of the Constitution and the Constitutional Court’s ambivalent stance
towards the interpretation of s 27(1)(a), there may be scope for the
horizontal application of certain of the obligations engendered by the
right of access to health care services. This conclusion is augmented by
increasing acceptance that other health-related rights in the Constitution,
notably the right not to be refused emergency medical treatment in s 27(3)
and the right of children to ‘basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care
29 Chirwa (SAJHR) (note 7 above) 565.
30 See Carstens & Kok (note 15 above) 442; AR Chapman ‘Core Obligations Related to the
Right to Health and their Relevance for South Africa’ in D Brand & S Russell (eds) Exploring
the Core Content of Socio-economic Rights: South African and International Perspectives (2002)
35, 45; K Pillay ‘South Africa’s Commitment to Health Rights in the Spotlight: Do we Meet
the International Standard?’ in Brand & Russell (ibid) 61, 63-4; B Toebes ‘Towards an
Improved Understanding of the International Human Right to Health’ (1999) 21 Human
Rights Q 661, 666-67; 669.
31 Strydom v Afrox Healthcare Bpk [2001] 4 All SA 618 (T), 626b-h; 627f-g.
32 See also Currie (note 19 above) 74.
33 Afrox Healthcare v Strydom 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA) paras 13; 15; 19-21. This finding will be
criticised in III(b) below.
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services and social services’ in s 28(1)(c), entail certain horizontally
enforceable obligations.34
As set out in II(a) above, the preferred avenue through which to give
horizontal effect to human rights appears to be by way of judicial
development of the common law. Even on the Constitutional Court’s
combined reading of subsecs 27(1) and (2) of the Constitution, common-
law development appears to be a viable remedial paradigm for giving
effect to the horizontal obligations entailed by s 27(1)(a). Jonathan
Klaaren argues that, on a reading of the phrase ‘reasonable legislative
and other measures’ in s 27(2) of the Constitution as including also
judicial measures, it is possible to view the judicial task under s 27(2) as
comprising an obligation to ensure that the common law, as part of the
general legal framework for the realisation of socio-economic rights, is
‘reasonable’. Hence, Klaaren regards courts as being constitutionally
required to develop the common law in situations where this is necessary
for the effective enjoyment of socio-economic rights.35
Given that South African courts have for many years engaged in
developing the common law in accordance with the changing social
mores and are now under an explicit constitutional mandate to ensure
that the common law resonates with the spirit, purport and objects of the
Bill of Rights, they should be able to fulfill the remedial aspects of their
role in this regard with relative ease. While the attempt in Afrox to align
the common law with the values associated with s 27(1)(a) of the
Constitution was ultimately unsuccessful, that case illustrates that it
would be possible for courts to indirectly enforce certain horizontal
aspects of s 27(1)(a), without straying too far from their institutional
comfort zone.36
In Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security, the Constitutional
Court determined that any court which is called upon to develop the
common law in accordance with s 39(2) of the Constitution must first
establish whether and to what extent the current state of the common law
34 The enforcement of the horizontal dimensions of these rights are beyond the scope of this
article. On the horizontal enforcement of s 27(3), see M Pieterse ‘Enforcing the Right not to be
Refused Emergency Medical Treatment: Towards Appropriate Relief’ (2007) 18 Stell LR
(forthcoming) at text accompanying notes 21-5 and authorities cited there. On the horizontal
dimensions of s 28(1)(c), see Grootboom (note 17 above) paras 71-8 (holding that s 28(1)(c)
operates in the first instance against parents and only in the second instance against the State);
TAC (note 18 above) paras 77-9 (somewhat qualifying the Grootboom position) and discussion
in, for instance, M Pieterse ‘Reconstructing the Private/Public Dichotomy? The Enforcement
of Children’s Constitutional Social Rights and Care Entitlements’ (2003) TSAR 1, 10-11; P
Proudlock ‘Children’s Socio-economic Rights: Do they Have a Right to Special Protection?’
(2002) 3(2) ESR Rev 6, 7-8; J Sloth-Nielsen ‘Too Little? Too Late? The Implications of the
Grootboom Case for State Responses to Child-headed Households’ (2003) 7 Law, Democracy
& Development 113, 119-21.
35 J Klaaren ‘A Remedial Interpretation of the Treatment Action Campaign Decision’ (2003) 19
SAJHR 455, 460-61. See also J Klaaren ‘An Institutional Interpretation of Socio-economic
Rights and Judicial Remedies After TAC’ in Botha et al (eds) (note 19 above) 105, 112.
36 See also remarks of Currie (note 19 above) 74; Klaaren (in Botha et al) (note 35 above) 115.
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requires development, in light of the circumstances of the case.
Thereafter, it should decide on the manner in which developments that
are necessary for the common law to reflect the spirit, purport and
objects of the Constitution should be effected in the context of the
particular matter.37 In the following section, I illustrate that current
common law rules in relation to the regulation of the doctor-patient
relationship could easily be applied or developed in a manner that
adequately gives effect to the spirit of s 27(1)(a) of the Constitution. Such
developments, I argue, may result in more tangible protection of the
interests of the beneficiaries of the right of access to health care services in
circumstances where their enjoyment of the right is threatened or
curtailed by the actions of other private entities.
III THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO TREATMENT AND THE COMMON-LAW
REGULATION OF THE DOCTOR-PATIENT RELATIONSHIP
Private health care practitioners and institutions appear to be directly
implicated by the constitutional guarantee of a right to have access to
health care services, for the obvious reason that they are in the business of
rendering the very services that are the object of the constitutional
entitlement. The nature of the right to have access to health care services
thus suggests the possibility of its horizontal application to private health
care practitioners and institutions, whereas section II(b) above has shown
that at least certain of the obligations imposed by the right are capable of
horizontal application.
The kinds of functions performed by health care practitioners and
institutions, as well as their relationship to the public, further suggest that
they are capable, in their day-to-day operation, of complying with (at
least some of) the obligations inherent to the right of access to care.
Private hospitals, especially, appear capable of bearing horizontal
obligations. This is so, first, due to the significant resources at their
disposal, secondly, to the fact that they render services identical to those
rendered by public hospitals (which are directly bound by s 27 in terms of
s 8(1) of the Constitution) and, thirdly, to the impact of the exercise of
their powers and functions on the enjoyment of the right of access to
care.38 Indeed, from the perspective of rights-holders, there is preciously
little difference between public and private health care institutions and it
37 Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) para 40.
38 See, for example, D Brand ‘Disclaimers in Hospital Admission Contracts and Constitutional
Health Rights’ (2002) 3(2) ESR Rev 17, 18 (criticising the SCA for failing to acknowledge the
‘public’ nature of the functions of private hospitals in Afrox (note 33 above)).
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would seem incongruous for health-related constitutional rights to
operate against some, but not other, health service providers.39
Apart from the obvious similarities between the functions fulfilled by
private health care practitioners and those of their public sector
counterparts, justifications for horizontal application of health-related
rights against private doctors include the extent to which the private
health care profession has historically been allowed to regulate itself and
the significant state investment in the education of health care
practitioners.40 Moreover, given the extent of trust and dependancy
within doctor-patient relationships and the imbalances of knowledge,
power and resources that are inherent to them, these may be conceived as
‘special relationships’ to which socio-economic obligations should attach.
Indeed, it is accepted in most legal systems that a number of health-
related entitlements and obligations flow from a duty of care triggered by
the contractual relationship between doctor and patient, that are not
necessarily restricted to the terms of such contract.41
South African common law of contract and delict provides a detailed
framework for the regulation of these entitlements and obligations within
the doctor-patient relationship. To a significant extent, this framework
already caters for the enforcement of constitutional health-related
entitlements within the private realm. It also appears that a few,
relatively uncontroversial, developments to the existing state of the
common law may go a great length towards aligning it with the spirit,
purport and objects of a Bill of Rights that contains a justiciable right to
have access to health care services. In what follows, I provide brief
examples of possible common law developments that would honour the
constitutional obligation to protect the health-related socio-economic
rights of the public from infringements by private health care
practitioners, first, by crystallising the nature and extent of health care
professionals’ private socio-economic obligations and, secondly, by
allowing for adequate, effective and appropriate relief for the victims
of rights-violations that occur within the relationships between patients
and private health care providers.
39 Another pertinent example of private actors in the health industry that may be considered
bound by health rights along similar lines is that of pharmaceutical companies, due to their
vast command over power and resources and the significant consequences of their actions on
rights of access to medication. See Ellmann (note 9 above) 460-61 and generally S Joseph
‘Pharmaceutical Corporations and Access to Drugs: The ‘‘Fourth Wave’’ of Corporate
Human Rights Scrutiny’ (2003) 25 Human Rights Quarterly 425-52.
40 See L Baldwin-Ragaven; J De Gruchy & L London (eds) An Ambulance of the Wrong Colour:
Health Professionals; Human Rights and Ethics in South Africa (1999) 10; 210-11; D Giesen ‘A
Right to Health Care? A Comparative Perspective’ (1994) 4 Health Matrix 277, 286.
41 See Giesen (ibid) 286; 290. In Magware v Minister of Health 1981 (4) SA 472 (Z) 475A-B;
476G-H; 477A-B the contractual obligation flowing from taking on a patient was described as
a ‘special relationship’ triggering a duty of care.
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(a) Access to care and the common-law regulation of the obligation to
treat
An obvious barrier to accessing health care services, especially in the
private health care sector, occurs where health care practitioners or
establishments refuse to render treatment to particular patients or groups
of patients. Such refusal is typically justified on a variety of grounds,
including the failure by patients to satisfy hospital admission require-
ments (such as having to produce proof of medical aid membership or
having to sign indemnity forms), the inability of health care practitioners
or facilities to render treatment of the kind requested, the inability of
patients to pay for treatment and health care professionals’ conscientious
objection to rendering particular forms of treatment. It is conceivable
that, whereas such a denial of care would often be legitimate, it may
sometimes amount to an unjustifiable barrier to accessing health care
services and may accordingly constitute an infringement of s 27(1)(a) of
the Constitution.
At common law, a health care professional is as a general rule free to
refuse to accept a particular person as a patient.42 Once a health care
practitioner has accepted a patient, however, she or he is contractually,
morally and ethically obliged to continue rendering treatment. Excep-
tions to this general rule include situations where treatment can feasibly
be left to another health care professional who is willing to treat; where
the health care practitioner issues sufficient instructions for further
treatment; where further treatment is medically unnecessary, futile or
likely to do more harm than good; where the patient refuses further
treatment or where the practitioner gives the patient reasonable notice of
her intention to discontinue treatment while simultaneously ensuring that
alternative treatment options are available.43 It is thus possible to hold a
health care professional delictually liable for withholding treatment
unreasonably, in circumstances where a doctor-patient relationship has
come to be established. In determining whether or not a refusal of
treatment was reasonable, courts take into account factors such as the
doctor’s knowledge of the patient’s condition, the nature and seriousness
of the patient’s condition, the ability of the doctor to assist the patient,
42 See DJ McQuoid-Mason & SA Strauss ‘Medicine, Dentistry, Pharmacy and Other Health
Professions’ in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The Law of South Africa Volume 17 (1st Reissue
1999) 129, 143 and authorities cited there; SA Strauss ‘Medical and Health Law’ in F Bosman
(ed) Social Welfare Law (1982) 511, 519.
43 Factors listed by McQuoid-Mason & Strauss (note 42 above) 145. See also Magware v
Minister of Health (note 41 above) 475A-B; Giesen (note 40 above) 290; Hendriks (note 26
above) 376; BE Leech ‘The Right of the HIV-positive Patient to Medical Care: An Analysis of
the Costs of Providing Medical Treatment’ (1993) 9 SAJHR 39, 48; Strauss (note 42 above)
517.
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the availability of alternative treatment, the interests of the doctor’s other
patients as well as ethical considerations.44
The constitutionalisation of a right to have access to health care
services must necessarily influence the above assessment. I would argue
that the right to have access to health care services challenges the
foundation of the common law position that health care professionals are
regarded as always being free to refuse treatment, unless a doctor-patient
relationship has already been established. At the very least, the horizontal
operation of the right to equality and the concomitant equality guarantee
underlying the right of access to health care services should have the
effect of precluding any arbitrary refusal of treatment or any refusal that
is motivated by unfair discrimination.45 The common law should
accordingly be developed to reflect this. In addition, I would argue that
the values associated with the right to have access to health care services
would be better served by reversing the starting point of the common law
inquiry. This would entail that health care professionals are regarded as
duty-bound to provide treatment, regardless of the presence of a pre-
existing doctor-patient relationship, unless they can offer constitutionally
acceptable justification for refusing to do so. Accordingly, health care
professionals would incur delictual liability for damages suffered as a
result of any unjustifiable refusal to render treatment.
Developing the common law in the manner described here would serve
either to secure access to health care services for patients who were at risk
of being denied access without constitutionally acceptable justification,
or to tangibly compensate such patients for damages suffered as a result
of such denial of access. Whereas there obviously has to be guarded
against placing an undue burden on health care professionals to render
care regardless of the circumstances or their reasons for refusal, it is
submitted that health care professionals’ interests in this regard could be
adequately protected by developing rules of common law that limit
patients’ right of access to care, in accordance with s 8(3)(b) of the
Constitution. The accepted common law grounds of justification for
refusal to continue treating existing patients and the factors to be taken
into account in determining the reasonableness or otherwise of such
refusal, could serve as a useful starting point in this respect.
An inquiry into the reasonableness and justifiability of a refusal to
render particular treatment would often boil down to balancing interests
of health care professionals against those of their would-be patients. One
particularly controversial example of this is where a refusal to treat
relates to a health care professional’s moral, religious or ethical objection
44 McQuoid-Mason & Strauss (note 42 above) 145. This exposition of the common law is
substantially similar to my statement of the same rules in relation to the provision of
emergency medical treatment in Pieterse (2007) (note 34 above).
45 See in this regard also Hendriks (note 26 above) 377; Leech (note 43 above) 67.
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to rendering particular kinds of treatment. The context in which such
conscientious objection appears to arise most often is the provision of
termination of pregnancy services under the Choice on Termination of
Pregnancy Act 92 of 1996. Especially in rural areas, several instances of
health care professionals refusing to terminate pregnancies, out of moral
or religious objection, have been documented. This has resulted in a de
facto denial of access to termination services in situations where the
requested treatment is not accessible or available elsewhere in the
vicinity.46 An inquiry into the constitutional acceptability of justification
for refusing to perform a termination of pregnancy due to conscientious
objection must necessarily involve a balance between the implied right of
health care professionals to conscientious objection (derived from the
right to freedom of conscience, religion, belief and opinion in s 15 of the
Constitution) and the express right of patients to have access to
reproductive health care services.47
The Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act does not indicate how
this balance should be struck, although the determination in s 6 that
women who request termination services should be informed of their
rights in terms of the Act does impose limited restrictions on rights of
conscientious objection. Similarly, Charles Ngwena argues that refusal to
perform a termination of pregnancy out of conscientious objection would
generally amount to a reasonable and justifiable limitation on the right of
access to reproductive health care services, unless the termination is
required as a matter of medical emergency. Ngwena nevertheless regards
health care professionals as duty-bound, notwithstanding their rights of
conscientious objection, to refer the patient to a facility where a
termination service may in the alternative be accessed. Ngwena further
hints that rights of conscientious objection may more readily be limited in
rural areas where such alternative facilities are not available or
accessible.48
I would go further to suggest that, in circumstances where a refusal to
provide medical treatment due to conscientious objection amounts to a
de facto denial of access to care, implied rights of conscientious objection
should be overruled by the express right of access to health care services.
In other words, the interests of patients should generally be held to
outweigh those of medical practitioners in this context. Refusal to treat
due to conscientious objection would, on my suggestion, be regarded as
reasonable and justifiable only in circumstances where alternative
46 See cases discussed by C Ngwena ‘Conscientious Objection and Legal Abortion in South
Africa: Delineating the Parameters’ (2003) 28(1) J for Juridical Science 1, 4.
47 Ibid 9-10. See also Ellmann (note 9 above) 458.
48 See C Ngwena ‘Accessing Abortion Services under the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy
Act: Realising Substantive Equality’ (2000) 25 J for Juridical Science 19, 39; Ngwena (note 46
above) 5; 9; 11-3; 16.
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services are practically available and accessible to the patient and where
the patient was alerted to such options by the health care professional.
(b) Quality of care and the common law on medical negligence
As argued under II(b) above, the s 27(1)(a) right to have access to health
care services must be understood to imply a justiciable standard of
quality of care, for it to comply with relevant international human rights
norms and to have practical significance for those who suffer damages
through receiving negligent or substandard care. Furthermore, the state’s
obligation to protect citizens from private infringements of the right to
have access to care requires the presence of effective and practicable
remedial avenues which ensure that rights-bearers are in the position to
demand that the health care services they receive satisfy at least minimum
standards of professionalism and scientific appropriateness. Patients
should further be entitled to adequate compensation for damages
suffered as a result of receiving care which falls short of such standards.
There have been welcome obiter remarks by South African High Courts
which acknowledge that the enjoyment of the right of access to health
care services is significantly compromised where quality standards are not
adhered to or are not enforced.49
The task of establishing when the quality of treatment received is to be
regarded as adequate, so as to satisfy the quality standard inherent in
s 27(1)(a), has been significantly simplified by the development of a
quality yardstick in common-law cases dealing with medical negligence.
This standard involves that failure by a health care professional to
exercise a degree of skill and care that may reasonably be expected of the
average, reasonably skilled practitioner in his or her field of medical
expertise in similar circumstances, can lead to contractual or delictual
liability.50 I would submit that the implied standard of ‘reasonable care’
is sufficiently flexible to accommodate quality concerns in relation to s
27(1)(a), while simultaneously remaining realistic and sensitive to the
49 See Strydom v Afrox Health Care (note 31 above) 626b-e; 627f-g; Korf v Health Professions
Council of South Africa 2000 (1) SA 1171 (T), 1179B-D.
50 See, for example, Esterhuizen v Administrator, Transvaal 1957 (3) SA 710 (T) 723C-E; Blyth
v Van den Heever 1980 (1) SA 191 (A) 193B-94A; 221A; 221D-E; Magware v Minister of
Health (note 41 above) 477A-B; Correira v Berwind 1986 (4) SA 60 (ZHC) 63E-F; I; 66C-D;
S v Kramer 1987 (1) SA 887 (W) 893E-94J; Pringle v Administrator, Transvaal 1990 (2) SA 379
(W) 385A-D; 396H-I; Applicant v Administrator, Transvaal 1993 (4) SA 733 (W) 738D-F;
Collins v Administrator, Cape 1995 (4) SA 73 (C) 81J-82B; Oldwage v Lourens [2004] 1 All SA
532 (C) paras 40-6; Van der Walt v De Beer 2005 (5) SA 151 (C);McDonald v Wroe [2006] 3 All
SA 565 (C) para 6; also NJB Claassen & T Verschoor Medical Negligence in South Africa
(1992) 13-4; McQuoid-Mason & Strauss (note 42 above) 152-53; 198-99; SA Strauss Doctor,
Patient and the Law (3ed 1991) 95-6; 252; Strauss (note 42 above) 517; N van Dokkum
‘Hospital Consent Forms’ (1996) 7 Stell LR 249; N van Dokkum ‘The Evolution of Medical
Malpractice Law in South Africa’ (1997) 41 J of African Law 175, 190; F van Oosten
‘Financial Resources and the Patient’s Right to Health Care: Myth and Reality’ (1999) 32 De
Jure 1, 4-5; 8.
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context within which health care services are rendered. The standard thus
strikes a fair balance between the competing interests of health care
professionals and patients in this regard. Common law accordingly
presents a viable remedial avenue for recipients of negligent or
substandard care.
However, there are practical impediments regarding the application of
the common law quality standard to concrete cases, that significantly
restrict its remedial potency and accordingly diminish its effectiveness.
The spirit, purport and objects of a Constitution which takes health
rights seriously require that these be acknowledged and addressed, either
through a development of the relevant legal principles or through a
change in the manner in which courts currently apply them.
One such impediment, relating to the application (rather than the
content) of the medical negligence standard, is occasioned by the inherent
imbalance in scientific knowledge (and other resources) between patients
and doctors. This imbalance, coupled with the discipline-specific and
scientific nature of a test inquiring into ‘reasonable care’ rendered by a
‘reasonable practitioner’, make it notoriously difficult for a patient to
prove negligence or wrongdoing on the part of a health care
professional.51 An obvious manner in which to alleviate this difficulty
would be to apply the maxim of res ipsa loquitur in medical negligence
cases where an inference of negligence seems justified by the circum-
stances of the case. However, South African courts have historically been
unwilling to apply the maxim in cases of alleged medical negligence, out
of deference to the medical profession and in empathy with the often
difficult conditions under which health care professionals operate.52
Whereas one must remain sympathetic to these conditions, I agree with
suggestions that res ipsa loquitur should, at least where ‘the prejudicial
result is clearly in contrast with the acknowledged therapeutic objectives
and technique of the operation or treatment in question’, find application
in cases of alleged medical negligence.53 This is required not only by the
51 See Claassen & Verschoor (note 50 above) 27; L Hebblethwaite ‘Mishap or Malpractice?
Liability in Delict for Medical Negligence’ (1991) 108 SALJ 38, 38-9; 43. On the various
difficulties associated with the imbalances in knowledge and bargaining power in the doctor-
patient relationship see also E Elhauge ‘Allocating Health Care Morally’ (1994) 82 California
LR 1451, 1542; DM Frankford ‘Privatizing Health Care: Economic Magic to Cure Legal
Medicine’ (1992) 66 Southern California LR 1, 15-6; 55-7; 59-60; 93; P Gertler & J Van der
Gaag The Willingness to Pay for Medical Care: Evidence from Two Developing Countries
(1990) 16-7; 21; MA Hall ‘Rationing Health Care at the Bedside’ (1994) 69 New York Univ LR
693, 700-01.
52 See Mitchell v Dixon 1914 AD 519; Van Wyk v Lewis 1924 AD 438; also authorities cited and
discussed by PA Carstens ‘Die toepassing van res ipsa loquitur in gevalle van mediese
nalatigheid’ (1999) 32 De Jure 19, 21-4; Claassen & Verschoor (note 50 above) 28-30;
McQuoid-Mason & Strauss (note 42 above) 204.
53 Claassen & Verschoor (note 50 above) 28. See also authorities cited there. Carstens (note 52
above) 21-2; 24; 26 further lists several examples of cases clearly calling for application of res
ipsa loquitur. These include cases where there has been physical injury to a body part other
than that which was treated, where the wrong body part was treated, where the wrong limb
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constitutional guarantees of equality and a fair trial,54 but also by the
values associated with s 27(1)(a). The application of the maxim in such
cases would significantly enhance the potential of s 27(1)(a) to address the
imbalances in power inherent to the doctor-patient relationship and to
result in adequate compensation for those whose rights to receive care of
an appropriate quality have been infringed.
A further, and arguably more pernicious, impediment to the
effectiveness of the relevant common law principles in securing tangible
relief for patients whose rights to receive care of an adequate quality have
been infringed, is that the principles are increasingly excluded from
application in the majority of doctor-patient relationships in the private
health care sector. The great majority of private health care institutions
indemnify themselves against damages resulting from substandard or
negligent care administered by their personnel, by insisting that patients
waive their remedies in this regard upon entering into a contract of
admission to the institution. So prevalent is this practice that virtually no
patient of a private health care institution can nowadays successfully hold
the institution liable for rendering negligent or substandard care.55
In Afrox Healthcare v Strydom, the Supreme Court of Appeal
overturned a finding of the High Court that the terms of such an
exclusion clause were contra bonos mores and unenforceable by virtue of
infringing s 27(1)(a), since it felt that the terms of the exclusion clause did
not deny access to treatment and did not explicitly allow for the rendering
of negligent or substandard care. The argument that s 27(1)(a)
presupposed a minimum level of care was accordingly held not to be
relevant in the circumstances.56 While the Court was arguably correct
that exclusion clauses do not themselves deny access to care or condone
negligent or substandard care,57 it failed to appreciate that such clauses
prevent patients from availing themselves of their only meaningful
remedy where the quality guarantee underlying their right to have access
to health care services has been dishonoured.58 This is patently
was amputated, where there is operated on the wrong patient or the wrong operation is carried
out on a patient, where a patient is given the wrong medication or an over-dosage of
medication, or where medical instruments are left inside the body after an operation.
54 As argued by Carstens (ibid) 26-7.
55 See Brand (note 38 above) 18. For an exposition of the relevant principles from the common
law of contract, see Van Dokkum (1996) (note 50 above) 250-53.
56 Afrox (note 33 above) paras 13; 15; 19-21. The SCA emphasised that s 27(1)(a) would not
preclude private hospitals from charging fees or from setting conditions for rendering care. See
also remarks of Carstens & Kok (note 15 above) 439.
57 Refusing to admit a patient who refuses to agree to an exclusion clause may however fall foul
of s 27(1)(a). Carstens & Kok (ibid) 441; 444.
58 See Brand (note 38 above) 18; Carstens & Kok (note 15 above) 444; 452; RM Jansen & BM
Smith ‘Hospital Disclaimers: Afrox Healthcare v Strydom’ (2003) 28(2) J for Juridical Science
210, 215; Pearmain (note 5 above) 289; 300; P van den Heever ‘Exclusion of Liability of
Private Hospitals in South Africa’ (April 2003) De Rebus 47-8. Such disclaimers are also
incompatible with medical ethics. Carstens & Kok (ibid) 450.
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incompatible with the ethos of a Bill of Rights that regards this right as
justiciable and promises appropriate relief for its infringement.
Such a de facto expurgation of the common law pertaining to medical
negligence from private doctor-patient relationships may clearly be
avoided, by limiting the ambit of the common law understanding of
freedom of contract in order for it to resonate with the values associated
with s 27(1)(a) of the Constitution. It has for example been argued that,
given that exemption clauses amount to a de facto waiver of the quality-
guarantee underlying the right of access to health care services, private
hospitals should be under an obligation to alert prospective patients to
their existence.59 I would, however, argue that exclusion clauses in
hospital admission contracts should per se be viewed as being against
public policy (given that the concept of public policy must be understood
as also embodying the values underlying the rights in the Bill of Rights,
including the various rights associated with the right to health) and as
accordingly being unenforceable.60 It is hoped that Afrox will not be the
last word on the constitutionality of such exclusion clauses and that the
SCA or the Constitutional Court will adopt an approach that is more
sympathetic to the dilemma of individual patients attempting to assert
their right of access to health care services against the powerful collective
of the private health care sector.
IV CONCLUSION
In order for justiciable socio-economic rights to have meaningful
significance for their beneficiaries, the rights must, in appropriate
circumstances, be capable of tangibly contributing to the satisfaction of
the needs that prompted their constitutional inclusion.61 One manner in
which the effectiveness of socio-economic rights may be enhanced in this
respect is by allowing for the rights, or the values associated with their
protection, to infiltrate the legal regulation of ‘private’ relationships that
are crucial for their enjoyment.
In this article, I have argued for the indirect horizontal application of
socio-economic rights to such relationships. I have shown that the South
59 See Jansen & Smith (note 58 above) 218.
60 See Jansen & Smith (ibid) 215-16 and authorities there cited; Pearmain (note 5 above) 299; DL
Pearmain ‘Contracting for Socio-economic Rights: A Contradiction in Terms? (Part 2)’ (2006)
69 THRHR 466, 475. For a ‘pure’ contract-law argument to the same effect, see T Naude & G
Lubbe ‘Exemption Clauses — A Rethink Occasioned by Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom’
(2005) 122 SALJ 441, 456-57. Carstens & Kok (note 15 above) 455 call on the legislature to
outlaw disclaimers in standard-form hospital admission contracts. The position of patients in
this regard will likely be ameliorated somewhat by the National Health Act 61 of 2003, s 46 of
which determines that ‘[e]very private health establishment must maintain insurance cover
sufficient to indemnify a user for damages that he or she might suffer as a consequence of a
wrongful act by any member of its staff or by any of its employees’.
61 See Heywood (note 6 above) 133; 147; Liebenberg (note 9 above) 159; 176; Liebenberg (note 3
above) 18; Pieterse (note 26 above) 478.
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African constitutional text allows for the application of some of the
obligations imposed by socio-economic rights to certain private entities,
but also acknowledged that such application should, for the most part, be
indirect (by way of legislative regulation and/or common law develop-
ment). I then identified and elaborated upon several obligations inherent
to the right of access to health care services that appear capable of such
horizontal application. I proceeded to focus on the indirect horizontal
impact of these obligations on the private-law regulation of the doctor-
patient relationship, one of a number of ‘special relationships’ that is
central to the actualisation of the right.62 I provided examples of
instances where the rules of common law that regulate aspects of this
relationship may be developed, or applied differently, in order to give
better effect to the spirit, purport and objects of the right to have access
to health care services and in order to honour the State’s constitutional
obligation to protect individual members of society from infringements of
this right by private entities.
I believe that there is significant unexplored potential for the
actualisation of socio-economic rights through their indirect horizontal
application. This is so, first, because of the fairly extensive body of
common law principles applicable to the doctor-patient relationship and
other ‘special relationships’ from which socio-economic obligations may
flow. These rules often present a detailed and context-sensitive legal
framework for the elaboration and enforcement of private socio-
economic obligations and allow for the granting of effective remedies
to individuals whose interests have been adversely affected by other
private entities’ non-compliance with these obligations. In many
instances, the current state of common law already gives effect to
constitutional socio-economic guarantees in this respect, or requires only
minimal developments or shifts in application in order for it to do so.
Secondly, South African courts are likely to be more comfortable with
the evaluative and remedial paradigms associated with common law
development than with the direct application of socio-economic rights.
This is because South African legal culture, like legal cultures in most
liberal democracies, tends to be skeptical of direct judicial involvement in
socio-economic matters but accepts the judicial development of common
law rules, in accordance with prevailing societal morality, as uncon-
troversial.63 Common law therefore not only offers a wide array of
62 Other ‘special relationships’ that may be equally significant for the enjoyment of the right of
access to care include the parent-child relationship, the employer-employee relationship and
contractual relationships such as those between Medical Aid Schemes and their members. The
values associated with the constitutional protection of the right to have access to health care
services may also usefully infiltrate the regulation of these relationships.
63 On the challenges posed by liberal-democratic legal culture, and in particular the conservative
South African variant thereof, for the judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights, see
Pieterse (note 2 above) 396-99 and authorities cited there.
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potential remedies that may amount to adequate reparation for
infringements of socio-economic rights, but also provides the ideal
environment for an exploration of their horizontal dimensions.
Overall, this article has shown that the legal consequences of justiciable
socio-economic rights may extend beyond the effects of asserting
concrete, positive claims against states in public law litigation. Since
meaningful access to socio-economic amenities is often dependent on the
assertion of and compliance with socio-economic claims within private
relationships, the actualisation of justiciable socio-economic rights also
requires the transformation of those aspects of private law that regulate
such relationships. Moreover, since it cannot be denied that the effects of
poverty and associated socio-economic deprivation transcend the public
and private spheres, it is essential that the legal tools occupied with the
alleviation thereof do the same.
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